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Criminal Law – Deadly Weapon Enhancement for Unarmed Offender 
Summary 
 
 This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction of conspiracy to commit robbery and 
robbery with the use of a deadly weapon 
  
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 Appellant James Brooks’ judgment of conviction of conspiracy to commit robbery and 
robbery with the use of a deadly weapon is reversed and the matter is remanded to the district 
court for a new trial.  The district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury what it was required 
to find to subject an unarmed offender to the deadly weapon enhancement.  The district court 
further erred in refusing to instruct the jury that absent an agreement to cooperate in achieving a 
criminal purpose, mere knowledge of, acquiescence in, or approval of that purpose does not 
establish conspiracy. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 On November 14, 2003, Christianne Davis arrived at her home and drove in the garage.  
Davis left the garage door open and when she exited the vehicle, she was confronted by a man 
with a gun standing in her garage.  The armed man demanded Davis’s purse and she gave it to 
him.  The armed man exited the garage and ran towards a dark green Saturn near the driveway.  
The armed man got into the car which then sped away.  Davis observed the driver of the getaway 
car, memorized the car’s license plate number and called 911. 
 
 The police officers that responded to Davis’s 911 call obtained the name and address of 
the owner of the dark green Saturn.  James Brooks appeared at the address driving the dark green 
Saturn.  He told police officers that he had possession of the car and no one else had driven 
before leading police officers to a dumpster containing Davis’s purse. 
 
 Brooks was arrested and escorted to Clark County Detention Center.  Brooks admitted to 
driving the getaway car, but refused to identify the gunman.  Davis arrived at Clark County 
Detention Center shortly after Brooks’ apprehension and identified him as the driver of the 
getaway car.   
 
 At trial, Brooks proffered a jury instruction that provided an unarmed offender is subject 
to the deadly weapon enhancement only if he had knowledge that the armed offender was armed 
and had the ability to exercise control over the weapon.  The State offered a more general 
instruction that an unarmed offender’s participation by aiding or abetting the armed offender in 
the unlawful use of the weapon subjects the unarmed offender to the deadly weapon 
enhancement.  The district court accepted the State’s instruction and expressed doubt that the 
State is required to prove that the unarmed offender had the ability to exercise control over the 
weapon.  The district court stated the focus should be whether the unarmed offender had 
knowledge that a weapon would be used during the commission of the underlying offense. 
 
 Brooks also proffered an instruction advising the jury that absent an agreement to 
cooperate in achieving a criminal purpose, mere knowledge of, acquiescence in, or approval of 
that purpose does not establish conspiracy.  The district court refused to give the proffered jury 
instruction. 
 
 A jury found Brooks guilty of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon and conspiracy to 
commit robbery.  Brooks appealed the conviction to the Nevada Supreme Court.  Brooks’ first 
main challenge to his conviction is that the district court erroneously refused to give an 
instruction offered by the defense regarding the circumstances in which an unarmed offender is 
subject to a deadly weapon enhancement.  The second main challenge is that the district court 
erroneously refused to give an instruction that absent an agreement to cooperate in achieving a 
criminal purpose, mere knowledge of, acquiescence in, or approval of that purpose does not 
establish conspiracy.  Brooks also advanced multiple other challenges to his conviction that were 
not addressed by the Court. 
 
Discussion 
 
A. Deadly Weapon Instruction 
 
 The Court begins its analysis of the deadly weapon instruction by stating that the 
constructive possession test in Brooks’ proffered instruction is an accurate statement of current 
Nevada law.  NRS 193.165(1) states that any person who “uses” a deadly weapon in the 
commission of a crime is subject to a sentence enhancement.1  The Court cites Anderson v. 
State2 for the proposition that an unarmed offender’s participation by aiding and abetting an 
armed offender “in the unlawful use of the weapon, makes the [unarmed offender] equally 
subject to the assed penalty inflicted upon defendants who commit crimes through the use of 
deadly weapons.”  The Court in Anderson set forth scenarios where an unarmed offender could
be subject to the sentence enhancement and the focus of the scenarios is on whether the unarm
offender had knowledge of the use of the weapon and his criminal acts were facilitated by th
use of the
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 However, the Anderson Court went on to state that “the possession necessary to justify 
statutory enhancement may be actual or constructive; it may exclusive or joint.”3  Furthermore, 
constructive possession for the purposes of the deadly weapon enhancement requires that “the 
unarmed participant has knowledge of the other offender’s being armed and [has] the ability to 
exercise control over” the weapon.4  The Court noted two problems with the Anderson 
constructive possession test.  First, NRS 193.165(1) requires “use” of a deadly weapon in the 
commission of an offense, not possession, so Anderson’s reliance on constructive possession was 
outside the statute’s limits.  Second, the control prong of the Anderson test can lead to absurd 
 
1 NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.165(1) 
2 95 Nev. 625, 630 (1979) 
3 Id. 
4 Id. 
results depending on whether the unarmed offender could actually exert verbal or physical 
control over the weapon.  For these reasons the Court explicitly rejected the constructive 
possession test in Anderson for the purposes of determining whether an unarmed offender is 
subject to an enhanced sentence for an accomplice’s use of a deadly weapon. 
 
 The new test proffered by the Court is that to determine whether an unarmed offender is 
subject to an enhanced sentence under NRS 193.165, the appropriate test is whether the unarmed 
offender “used” the deadly weapon in the commission of the offense.  An unarmed offender 
“uses” a deadly weapon and is subject to a sentence enhancement when the unarmed offender is 
liable as a principal for the offense that is sought to be enhanced.  This occurs when another 
principal to the offense is armed with and uses a deadly weapon in the commission of the offense 
and the unarmed offender had knowledge of the deadly weapon. 
 
 The Court stated that the State presented evidence that Brooks drove the getaway car 
during the robbery and knew the location of Davis’s purse.  However, the State did not establish 
that Brooks had knowledge of the other offender’s use of the gun.  The Court instructed that the 
State must prove that Brooks is liable as a principal for the robbery, that another principal to the 
robbery was armed with and used a deadly weapon in the commission of the robbery, and that 
Brooks had knowledge of the use of the deadly weapon.  The Court then found that the district 
court’s error was not harmless. 
 
B. Conspiracy Instruction 
 
 The Court stated that although the jury was instructed on conspiracy, “[a] positive 
instruction as to the elements of the crime does not justify refusing a properly worded negatively 
phrased “position” or “theory” instruction.”5  Brooks presented the defense theory that he was 
present at the robbery but did not know a robbery was going to take place and did not conspire to 
commit it.  The Court noted that there was little evidence in the record that Brooks conspired to 
commit the robbery other than his presence at the scene of the crime.  The Court held that 
Crooks was entitled to the instruction that absent an agreement to cooperate in achieving a 
criminal purpose, mere knowledge of, acquiescence in, or approval of that purpose does not 
establish conspiracy.  It was accurate statement of law and the evidence presented at trial could 
support his theory that he only learned of the robbery after it occurred.  The Court ruled that this 
was not harmless error because the jury may not have convicted Brooks of conspiracy to commit 
robbery if it had heard his proffered instruction. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Court clarified its test for determining when an unarmed offender is subject to a 
deadly weapon enhancement and overruled the Anderson constructive possession test.  The 
Court held that the district court erred in refusing to give Brooks’ proffered jury instructions on 
the deadly weapon sentence enhancement and conspiracy charge.  The Court ruled that the 
district court’s errors were not harmless.  Accordingly, the Court reversed Brooks judgment of 
conviction and remanded the matter to the district court for a new trial. 
                                                            
5 Crawford v. State, 121 Nev. 744, 753 (2005) (quoting Brooks v. State, 103 Nev. 611, 614 (1987)) 
